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COMMENT
DELAYED ACCESS TO GENERIC MEDICINE: A
COMMENT ON THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND
THE "APPROVAL BOTTLENECK"
Ankur N. Patel*
Prescription drug costs can be astronomical. The advent of generic
drugs, which sell at substantially lower prices than their brand-name
counterparts, can save consumers billions of dollars per year. The Hatch-
Waxman Act, which governs the introduction of generic pharmaceuticals
into the marketplace, produces an undesired side effect-the "approval
bottleneck." This Comment examines the "approval bottleneck"-a
potential roadblock to the generic drug approval process, and comments on
attempts to alleviate the problem.
This Comment suggests that developments in statutes and case law have
made leaps in attempting to alleviate the "approval bottleneck" problem.
The Comment evaluates these developments, which include (1) the ability of
a subsequent Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) filer to trigger
the generic exclusivity period of the first ANDA filer; (2) the forfeiture
provisions; (3) declaratory judgments and the relaxed declaratory
judgment test; and (4) the rulings on covenants not to sue. Despite these
attempts, however, the potential harm to consumers resulting from delayed
access to generic medicines remains.
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INTRODUCTION
Prescription drug costs can be daunting to consumers. The advent of
generic drugs, which sell at "substantially lower prices than their brand-
name counterparts," can save consumers "tens of billions of dollars per
year."' The average price per dose of a generic drug can be drastically less
than its brand-name counterpart, especially as more generic competitors
enter the market. 2 A generic drug can cost as low as less than ten percent of
the price of its brand-name counterpart. 3 Therefore, innovator companies,
who develop brand-name drugs, will often try to delay the introduction of
generic versions of their brand-name drugs. As a brief example, consider
the following real-life situation. Sepracor, an innovator pharmaceutical
1. Richard G. Frank, The Ongoing Regulation of Generic Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1993, 1993 (2007); see FDA, What Are Generic Drugs?,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Unde
rstandingGenericDrugs/ucm144456.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) ("According to the
Congressional Budget Office, generic drugs save consumers an estimated $8 to $10 billion a
year at retail pharmacies. Even more billions are saved when hospitals use generics.").
2. See Frank, supra note 1, at 1995.
3. See id.
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company, holds the six patents for the brand-name drug Xopenex. 4 In
accordance with the Hatch-Waxman Act, 5 which encourages generic
pharmaceutical companies to bring cheaper generic versions of brand-name
drugs to market, Breath, a generic pharmaceutical company, filed an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) in June 2005 to market a
generic version of Xopenex.6 As the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer, Breath
is entitled to a 180-day exclusivity period during which no other generic
version of Xopenex may enter the marketplace. 7 Sepracor brought a patent
infringement suit against Breath for all six patents in October 2005.8
However, Sepracor and Breath settled their lawsuit in early 2008, before a
decision had been made as to the validity of Sepracor's patents or
infringement by Breath.9 The settlement allows Breath to enter the market
with a generic version of Xopenex in August 2012.10 In the meantime, in
July 2005, Dey also filed an ANDA to market a generic version of
Xopenex."l Sepracor, however, sued Dey on only five out of the six patents
and provided a covenant not to sue in reference to the remaining patent. 12
Dey, as the second generic ANDA filer, cannot have its generic version of
Xopenex approved until the exhaustion of the 180-day exclusivity provided
to Breath. 13 However, due to the settlement, exhaustion of the exclusivity
and, therefore, approval of Dey's generic version of Xopenex will not occur
until after the launch of Breath's generic version of Xopenex in August
2012.14 Is Dey stuck? What is the purpose of a covenant not to sue? Even
if Dey can manage to overcome the "approval bottleneck," is there any
remaining harm to consumers?
This Comment explores the evolution of the law impacting the "approval
bottleneck"-including the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), 15 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
4. See Dey, L.P. v. Sepracor, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 355, 358 (D. Del. 2009).
5. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
6. See Dey, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 358-59.
14. See id. at 359.
15. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 20, 21, 25,
26, 29, 31, 42, 45, and 48 U.S.C.). The amended provisions from the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) apply to Abbreviated New
Drug Applications (ANDAs) filed after December 8, 2003, but only if there was no
Paragraph IV certification to the "listed drug" by any other ANDA filer prior to December 8,
2003 (post-MMA ANDAs). See Erika Lietzan & David E. Kom, Issues in the Interpretation
of 180-Day Exclusivity, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 49, 51 (2007); see also Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1 102(b)(1),
117 Stat. 2066, 2460 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 note) (Effective Date of 2003
Amendments); Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1357 n.2 (Fed.
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Co. v. Barr Laboratories Inc. 'S 1 6 ruling on subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA
filers, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.'s 17 all-the-circumstances test,
and Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Forest Laboratories
Inc.'s18 ruling on covenants not to sue. Furthermore, the Comment
examines whether enough has been done to eliminate the harm to
consumers-delayed access to lower priced generic drugs-caused by the
"approval bottleneck."
Part I of this Comment provides a comprehensive background on the
drug approval process. Part I also demonstrates how the Hatch-Waxman
Act's attempt to strike a balance between innovation and low-cost generics
can create an "approval bottleneck," an undesirable side effect of the Act.
Part II discusses the evolution of law and subsequent efforts to alleviate the
"approval bottleneck." Part III comments on the current state of affairs and
on why the Hatch-Waxman Act still does not provide an ideal solution to
overcoming the "approval bottleneck." Part III then proposes one possible
solution to the "approval bottleneck"-an elimination of the 180-day
exclusivity. Without the 180-day exclusivity, the mechanism that creates
an "approval bottleneck" no longer exists. However, the solution is not
ideal because elimination of the 180-day exclusivity eliminates a valuable
incentive currently available to generic companies to encourage challenging
suspect patents.
I. DEVELOPING THE "APPROVAL BOTTLENECK"
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides the regulatory framework governing
the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) approval of generic drugs. 19
The Act reflects a balance struck by Congress "between two competing
policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and development of new
drugs and (2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of
those drugs to market."'20 The balance, as discussed in Part I below, is a
combination of market exclusivities for innovator companies and an
abbreviated process for generic drug approvals. Part L.A provides a
comprehensive background on the drug approval process. Part I.B
discusses declaratory judgments, how declaratory judgments relate to the
Cir. 2008) ("[T]he MMA contained a grandfather provision specifying that the amendments
do not apply to Paragraph IV ANDAs filed before the date of the enactment of the MMA or
to subsequent Paragraph IV ANDAs filed after the enactment of the MMA if the first
Paragraph IV ANDA was filed prior to enactment of the MMA.").
While it may seem trivial to discuss the pre-MMA regime in this Comment, a closer look
demonstrates that disputes regarding pre-MMA ANDAs are still finding their way into
courts due to the lengthy Hatch-Waxman litigation process. See, e.g., Janssen, 540 F.3d
1353; Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
16. 289 F.3d 775 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
17. 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
18. 527 F.3d 1278.
19. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42
U.S.C.).
20. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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Hatch-Waxman Act, and the test to determine whether a declaratory
judgment action shall proceed. Part I.C explains how the operation of the
Hatch-Waxman Act may create an "approval bottleneck."
A. Drug Approval Process
Part L.A provides a comprehensive background on the drug approval
process. Specifically, Part I.A.1 provides the process by which a novel
compound may be approved and enter the marketplace as a brand-name
drug. Part I.A.2 discusses the generic drug approval process. Finally, Part
I.A.3 discusses the 180-day exclusivity, which is an incentive to generic
companies to be the first to seek approval of a generic version of an
innovative compound.
1. New Drug Application
An innovator pharmaceutical company seeking to "introduce . .. into
interstate commerce any new drug" must obtain FDA approval by
submitting a New Drug Application (NDA). 21 The NDA requires an
applicant to submit "information regarding the new drug's safety and
efficacy . "..."22 The applicant must also include in "the application the
patent number . . . of any patent[s] which ... could reasonably be asserted
if a person not licensed by the [patent] owner engaged in the manufacture,
use, or sale of the drug." 23 The FDA lists the patents submitted by the
innovator company in the "Orange Book."' 24 Once approved by the FDA,
21. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b) (2006); Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1282.
22. Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1355; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1355. Patents "are a form of legal
protection for intellectual property. Ownership in IP represents a proprietary right in
intangible products of the human mind .. " JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PATENT LAW 5 (2d ed. 2006). Patent protection "is necessary to encourage innovation."
JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 4 (2005). Patents are governed by Title 35
of the United States Code. Id. at 5. "Ordinarily, the patent term is set to 20 years from the
date the patent application is filed." Id. at 17; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). For
pharmaceutical patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides that "the patent term may be
extended for a portion of the time lost during clinical testing." THOMAS, supra, at 17. The
Act allows the patent holder to restore "to the patent term one-half of the time between" the
submission of an Investigational New Drug Application, which allows testing in humans,
"and the submission of an NDA, plus the entire period spent by the FDA approving the
NDA." Id. at 7-8, 17. However, there are caps to the length of the patent term. Id. The
maximum term restored may not exceed five years and the remaining patent term after
restoration may not exceed fourteen years following FDA approval of the New Drug
Application (NDA). Id.
24. See Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1355. The "Orange Book" is the common name of the
publication entitled Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations.
FDA, Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). There are three kinds of patents
that may be listed in the Orange Book: (1) compound claims, (2) formulation claims, and (3)
method of use or treatment claims. See Richard G. Greco, Litigating Pharmaceutical Patents
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, in DEVELOPMENTS IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECH
PATENT LAW 2008, at 163,168 (PLI Course Handbook, Sept. 11,2008).
2009] 1079
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the drug is known as a "listed drug" (brand-name drug).25 Tremendous
time (generally from ten to fifteen years) and enormous costs (generally
from $500 million to $2 billion) are required to develop a novel drug and
bring it to market.2 6 Therefore, innovator pharmaceutical companies are
given incentives, in the form of market exclusivity, to take on the endeavor
of bringing a novel drug compound to market. 27 Usually, five years of
market exclusivity is awarded to the innovator pharmaceutical company for
a novel drug. 28 During the market exclusivity period, the FDA will not
approve any generic versions of the innovator's brand-name drug.29
2. Abbreviated New Drug Application
In order to encourage lower-priced generic versions of listed drugs, the
Hatch-Waxman Act provides for an accelerated approval process known as
the Abbreviated New Drug Application. 30 Unlike the innovator company, a
25. See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1282; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i). "Listed drug" is
the more accurate term. However, for the purpose of simplification, in this Comment
"brand-name drug" is used synonymously with "listed drug."
26. See PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFGS. OF AM., DRUG DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT:
UNDERSTANDING THE R&D PROCESS 1, 10 (2007), available at
http://www.phrma.org/files/RD%20Brochure%20022307.pdf ("This whole process takes an
average of 10-15 years."); Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of
New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 420 (2006)
("[T]he paper estimated the cost per new drug to be $868 million. However, our estimates
vary from around $500 million to more than $2,000 million, depending on the therapy or the
developing firm."); see also Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski,
The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON.
151, 180 (2003) ("[W]e estimated that total R&D cost per new drug is US$ 802 million in
2000 dollars."). See generally C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1564 (2006) (noting
the process "is a lengthy, expensive process, consuming years and many millions of dollars
to conduct the necessary clinical trials").
27. See David Bickart, The Hatch-Waxman Act, in DEVELOPMENTS IN PHARMACEUTICAL
AND BIOTECH PATENT LAW 2008, at 8-1, 8-82 (PLI Course Handbook, Sept. 11, 2008). An
innovator company submitting an application for a drug that is a new chemical entity, "a
drug, no active ingredient (including any ester or salt of the active ingredient) of which has
been [previously] approved in any... [new drug] application," receives five years of market
exclusivity. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii); see Bickart, supra, at 8-81 to 8-85. A company that
undertakes new clinical investigations on an existing chemical entity, such as investigations
for new dosage forms, new indications, etc., may obtain three years of market exclusivity.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii), (iv); Bickart, supra, at 8-82, 8-85 to 8-86. An innovator
company that develops an orphan drug (used to treat rare diseases) receives seven years of
market exclusivity. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc; Bickart, supra, at 8-82, 8-87 to 8-90. "Rare
disease" is defined as one that "affects less than 200,000 persons in the United States," or
that "affects more than 200,000 in the United States and for which there is no reasonable
expectation that the cost of developing and making available in the United States a drug for
such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in the United States of such drug." 21
U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2). Lastly, if a company that conducts certain studies in children meets
certain requirements, it will be rewarded an additional six-month market exclusivity period
(Pediatric Exclusivity). See 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b); Bickart, supra, at 8-82, 8-90 to 8-94.
28. See supra note 27 (discussing market exclusivity for a new chemical entity).
29. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F); supra note 27 and accompanying text.
30. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550).
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generic pharmaceutical company can obtain FDA approval to market a
generic drug without having to conduct costly and lengthy clinical trials to
prove safety and efficacy of the drug. 3 1 The generic company can instead
rely on the innovator's clinical trial data, which was previously submitted to
the FDA with the innovator's NDA. 32 Generic pharmaceutical companies,
instead, are only required to show that the generic drug has the same active
ingredient as the listed drug and is its bioequivalent. 33
Even though the ANDA process provides for an accelerated approval of
generic drugs, the FDA may not approve any ANDAs until the market
exclusivity for the listed drug has expired. 34 Working in conjunction with
the market exclusivity of a listed drug are the patents protecting the listed
drug.3 5 Therefore, even after the market exclusivity of a listed drug has
expired, potentially clearing the way for FDA approval of a generic version,
the patents covering the listed drug may still be valid and unexpired. Thus,
in order for a generic pharmaceutical company to obtain FDA approval, the
ANDA must contain a certification as to each patent submitted and listed in
the Orange Book, which pertains to the listed drug.36 The generic company
must certify one of the following with respect to each Orange Book listed
patent:
(I) no patent information has been filed with the FDA; (II) the patent has
expired; (III the patent will expire on a particular date and approval of
the ANDA should be deferred until expiration; or (IV) in the opinion of
the ANDA applicant, the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug.37
These certifications, respectively referred to as Paragraph I, II, III, and IV
certifications, will dictate the timing of the ANDA approval by the FDA.
38
Therefore, a generic pharmaceutical company that wishes to market a
31. See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2008); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (j).
32. See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1282; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
33. See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1282; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). "Bioequivalence
means the absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent to which the active
ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents ... becomes available at the site of
drug action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an
appropriately designed study." 21 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2009).
Pharmaceutical equivalents means drug products in identical dosage forms that
contain identical amounts of the identical active drug ingredient, i.e., the same salt
or ester of the same therapeutic moiety ... [but] do not necessarily contain the
same inactive ingredients; and meet the identical compendial or other applicable
standard of identity, strength, quality, and purity, including potency and, where
applicable, content uniformity, disintegration times, and/or dissolution rates.
Id.
34. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F).
35. See generally supra note 23 (discussing patents, what they are, and the length of
patent protection).
36. See 21 U.S.C. § 355G)(2)(A)(vii); Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540
F.3d 1353, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
37. Janssen 540 F.3d at 1356 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)).
38. See id.
2009] 1081
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generic version of a listed drug, after expiration of the listed drug's market
exclusivity, but before the expiration of Orange Book listed patents
covering the listed drug, must include a Paragraph IV certification as to
each patent listed but not expired.39
Filing an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification is an act of patent
infringement.40 Therefore the generic drug company filing the ANDA must
provide notice to the patentee (patent holder) and the NDA holder.41 The
notice shall "include a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis of
the opinion of the applicant [generic drug company] that the [listed drug's]
patent is invalid or will not be infringed" by the manufacture and sale of a
generic version of the listed drug.42 The notice must be provided to the
patentee and NDA holder no later than twenty days from the postmark date
of the FDA notice to the generic drug company stating that the ANDA has
been filed. 43 Upon receiving the notice, the patentee and NDA holder have
the option to sue for patent infringement "on all, some, or none of the
patents included in the Paragraph IV Certification. '44
If the patentee or NDA holder does not bring a patent infringement suit
within forty-five days of receipt of the notice, the FDA may approve the
ANDA upon completion of their review of the application. 45 If a suit is
brought by the patentee or NDA holder then the FDA may not grant final
approval of the ANDA until the earlier of (1) thirty months "beginning on
the date of the receipt of the notice" by the patentee or NDA holder or (2) a
district court decision that the patents subject to Paragraph IV certification
are in fact invalid or not infringed. 46  For subsequent generic drug
companies filing an ANDA, the approval date of their generic version of the
listed drug is also subject to any 180-day exclusivity granted to the generic
drug company, which was first in filing an ANDA to the listed drug, as will
be discussed below. 47
3. 180-Day Exclusivity
To further encourage the introduction of lower-priced generics, the
Hatch-Waxman Act provides an incentive for generic pharmaceutical
companies to "challenge suspect... patents" and take on the litigation costs
and risks that come with the challenge. 48 The incentive is a grant-to the
first generic drug company to submit an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV
certification (First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer)-of "a 180-day period of
39. See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1283 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006); Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356.
41. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B);Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356.
42. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
43. See id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii).
44. See Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356.
45. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356.
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356.
47. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
48. Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356.
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generic marketing exclusivity during which time FDA will not approve a
later-filed" ANDA containing a Paragraph IV certification (Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filers) based on the same listed drug.49 The 180-day
exclusivity could be "worth hundreds of millions of dollars for a major
drug."'50 However, even though the FDA may not approve any other
ANDAs prior to the expiration of the 180-day exclusivity, the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer may not be the only generic version of the listed
drug available during the 180-day exclusivity due to "authorized
generics."' 51 An "authorized generic" is a generic version of the listed drug
licensed under the innovator's NDA by the innovator company. 52
Introduction of an authorized generic means greater generic competition
during the 180-day exclusivity and, therefore, lower prices for consumers. 53
However, a criticism of authorized generics is that they diminish the value
of the 180-day exclusivity because the innovator company licenses the
authorized generic to enter the market at the same time that the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's generic drug enters the market. 54 Therefore,
the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer can no longer enjoy one hundred
percent of the generic sales.
With regards to being awarded the 180-day exclusivity, the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer is entitled to the 180-day exclusivity period
regardless of whether it was sued by the innovator company. If sued, it is
entitled to the 180-day exclusivity period regardless of whether it actually
wins the patent infringement suit. 55 However, there are a few limitations to
the 180-day exclusivity including the limit that only one exclusivity is
permitted per product. 56 To qualify for the 180-day exclusivity, the First
49. Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006); Purepac Pharm.
Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("In order to encourage paragraph IV
challenges, thereby increasing the availability of low-cost generic drugs ... the first
company to win FDA approval of an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification has the
right to sell its drug without competition [from other generic competitors] for 180 days.");
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 289 F.3d 775, 778 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("This
provision is designed to provide an incentive, in the form of a 180-day period of marketing
exclusivity, to an ANDA filer that is the first to challenge a patent listed in the Orange
Book.").
50. Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1560.
51. See SHASHANK UPADHYE, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT AND FDA LAW §
13.12 (March 2009), available at WL, GENPHARMA Database.
52. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.12. An "authorized generic" is where the
innovator company licenses another company to launch a generic version of the listed drug
usually in competition with the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's generic drug. See id. The
authorized generic is licensed under the innovator's NDA; Therefore, the FDA is approving
no other ANDA during the 180-day exclusivity, but there are still two generics in the
marketplace during the exclusivity period. See id.
53. See Frank, supra note 1, at 1995.
54. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.12.
55. See Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356; Lietzan & Kom, supra note 15, at 59 ("Must a
Generic Applicant Have Been Sued and Must It Have Prevailed in That Patent Infringement
Suit To Obtain the Benefit of 180-Day Exclusivity? No to both.").
56. Pre-MMA, the 180-day exclusivity was provided on a patent-by-patent approach,
which created "mutual blocking exclusivities" and multiple exclusivity periods for a product.
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Paragraph IV ANDA Filer is only required to submit a substantially
See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.4; Lietzan & Kom, supra note 15, at 55. For example,
mutual blocking exclusivities would occur if a First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer filed its
application with certifications against all patents listed in the Orange Book covering the
listed drug but did not notice a new patent appear in the Orange Book covering the listed
drug, and a subsequent ANDA filer noticed the new patent and was first to file a Paragraph
IV certification against the newly listed patent. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.4. This
creates a mutual blocking position because the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer has a 180-
day exclusivity as to the patents originally listed in the Orange Book but cannot obtain final
FDA approval because the first filer is blocked by the 180-day exclusivity granted to the
subsequent filer, who was first to provide a Paragraph IV challenge against the additional
patent later listed in the Orange Book on the same listed drug. See id.
In the pre-MMA regime, a similar situation can lead to multiple exclusivities being
granted to a generic version of the same listed drug. The First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer is
granted a 180-day exclusivity by certifying against the listed Orange Book patents. Ifa later
patent appears, and the Paragraph IV ANDA Filer is first to file a Paragraph IV certification
against that later patent, the filer is granted a 180-day exclusivity as to that patent as well,
which effectively extends the exclusivity and further delays approval of any Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filers' applications. See generally UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.4 n. 1.
Post-MMA, "Congress endorsed a product-by-product approach ... with [only] one 180-
day exclusivity period per product." Lietzan & Korn, supra note 15, at 59; see also
UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.5. Applying the new provision, "the first applicant to file the
Paragraph IV certification [as] to any one patent in the Orange Book [covering the listed
drug] earns the potential 180-day exclusivity regardless of whether later filers file Paragraph
IV certifications to patents not [previously] certified" by the first applicant such as new
patents that appear. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.5. Therefore, unlike the previous
patent-by-patent approach, "going forward [post-MMA, there can be only]... one 180-day
exclusivity period per product." Lietzan & Korn, supra note 15, at 59. However, different
strengths (e.g., 10 mg, 20 mg, 30 mg) of a listed drug are deemed to be different products.
See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.5.
For pre-MMA ANDAs, if the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer loses the patent
infringement litigation and there is an "entry of a final, non-appealable judgment of [either
patent] infringement" by the ANDA filer or of validity of the innovator's patent, then the
Paragraph IV certification is no longer valid, which results in a loss of exclusivity with
respect to each patent that is deemed infringed or valid. See Bickart, supra note 27, at 8-80.
However, since there is a patent-by-patent approach in the pre-MMA setting, the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer may retain the 1 80-day exclusivity if the applicant was also first
to file on other patents for the same listed drug if there was no final, nonappealable judgment
of infringement or invalidity as to the other patents. See id. at 8-75, 8-80; see also Caraco
Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1286-87 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating
how Ivax was the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer as to two Lexapro patents, and even
though it had lost its litigation on one of the patents (and was affirmed on appeal), Ivax
retained its 180-day exclusivity because there was no final infringement or invalidity
decision as to the second patent).
For post-MMA ANDAs, the results are similar. If there is a final, nonappealable
judgment that the ANDA filer infringes a patent that was the subject of a Paragraph IV
certification or that the patent is determined to be valid, the Paragraph IV certification as to
that patent is invalid. See Bickart, supra note 27, at 8-71 to 8-72. This would require the
ANDA filer to change its certification from Paragraph IV to Paragraph III. Id. However, the
first ANDA filer does not forfeit its 180-day exclusivity unless it "amends or withdraws its
[P]aragraph IV certification for all of the patents [of the listed drug] as to which it made such
a certification .... Id.
For situations of patent expiration, a similar situation exists in both pre- and post-MMA
settings: exclusivity based on an expired patent is no longer valid. See Bickart, supra note
27, at 8-73 (noting that the MMA takes "FDA's pre-2003 position that 180-day exclusivity
cannot survive the expiration of the patent(s) upon which that exclusivity was based"); see
also infra note 83 (discussing expiration of patents).
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complete application and lawfully maintain a Paragraph IV certification. 57
One last comment on the 180-day exclusivity is that the exclusivity
incentive only exists in the United States.58 No other country rewards
generic companies for filing drug approval applications prior to the
expiration of the relevant patents.59
Having described how a company receives the 180-day exclusivity, Part
I.A.3.a and I.A.3.b discuss what actually triggers the 180-day exclusivity.
The triggering mechanism, however, is not uniform and instead depends on
whether the MMA provisions apply. The amended provisions of the MMA
apply to ANDAs filed after December 8, 2003, but only if there was no
Paragraph IV certification to the listed drug by any other ANDA filer prior
to December 8, 2003.60
a. 180-Day Exclusivity: Pre-MMA Triggering Provisions
Since the 180-day exclusivity blocks subsequent ANDA filers from
gaining FDA approval, it is crucial to determine when the 180-day
exclusivity period begins. For pre-MMA ANDAs, the "180-day exclusivity
period is triggered by the earlier of two events: (1) the [F]irst Paragraph IV
ANDA [F]iler's commercial marketing of a drug product [(commercial-
marketing trigger)]; or (2) a court decision of noninfringement or invalidity
[(court-decision trigger)]." 61 There was some confusion regarding the level
57. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb) (2006). This definition was added as a
result of MMA updates and was not included in the provisions relating to the 180-day
exclusivity pre-MMA. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.2. Compare 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000) (amended 2003), with 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).
However, even though the substantially complete requirement was added as a result of the
MMA, it applies to pre-MMA ANDAs, as it was prior FDA practice. See Erika King
Lietzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity Under the Hatch- Waxman Amendments to
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287, 290-91 (2004).
"If multiple [ANDA] applicants file substantially complete ANDAs with [Plaragraph IV
certifications on the same day... [and are] first to do so, those applicants can share
exclusivity." Lietzan & Kom, supra note 15, at 55; see also UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.2.
Sharing exclusivity was developed by FDA policy, as applicable to pre-MMA ANDAs and
required by statute for post-MMA ANDAs. Lietzan & Kom, supra note 15, at 55.
58. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.1 ("No other country has an exclusivity period to
reward generic companies to file generic applications for drugs to market before the relevant
patent expires."). Additionally, Procedures for Marketing Authorization, by the European
Commission, makes no reference to any generic exclusivity and instead states that "[t]he
generic .... once authorised, can ... be placed on the market 10 or 11 years after the
authorisation of the reference medicinal product, [listed drug], depending on the exclusivity
period applicable for the reference medicinal product." 2A EUROPEAN COMM'N, PROCEDURES
FOR MARKETING AUTHORISATION 21 (2005), available at hup://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
pharmaceuticals/eudralex/vol-2/a/vol2a chap 1_2005-11 .pdf.
59. See supra note 58 (noting lack of exclusivity outside the U.S.).
60. See supra note 15 (discussing application of the MMA and its grandfather
provision).
61. See Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1357 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
2008). Section 3550)(5)(B)(iv) reads as follows:
(iv) If the application contains a certification described in subclause (IV) of
paragraph (2)(A)(vii) and is for a drug for which a previous application has been
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of court decision required for the court-decision trigger. However, the
MMA provided clarity by stating that the court-decision trigger requires a
final decision of a court where no appeal other than a petition to the U.S.
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari has been or can be taken.62 Therefore
a district or lower court decision will not suffice; a court of appeals decision
is required, which, on average, takes a total of thirty-seven months from the
start of the patent infringement lawsuit to obtain.63 With regard to who can
start the clock and trigger the 180-day exclusivity, "[o]nly the [F]irst
Paragraph IV ANDA [F]iler can trigger its [own] 180-day exclusivity
period via the commercial-marketing trigger."'64 However, for the court-
decision trigger, not only can the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer trigger the
180-day exclusivity, "[S]ubsequent Paragraph IV ANDA [F]ilers can [also]
trigger the [F]irst Paragraph IV ANDA [F]iler's 180-day exclusivity period
via a successful court judgment. '65
b. 180-Day Exclusivity: Post-MMA Triggering and Forfeiture Provisions
For ANDAs that are subject to the MMA provisions, 66 there only exists a
commercial-marketing trigger for the 180-day exclusivity.67 The court-
decision aspect, however, is still addressed as part of a series of forfeiture
submitted under this subsection continuing such a certification, the application
shall be made effective not earlier than one hundred and eighty days after-
(I) the date the Secretary receives notice from the applicant under the
previous application of the first commercial marketing of the drug under the
previous application, or
(II) the date of a decision of a court in an action described in clause (iii)
holding the patent which is the subject of the certification to be invalid or not
infringed,
whichever is earlier.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000) (amended 2003).
62. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 1102(b)(3), 117 Stat. 2066, 2460 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 note)
(Effective Date of 2003 Amendments) ("[A] 'decision of a court' . . means a final decision
of a court from which no appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari) has been or can be taken."). This definition of the court-decision trigger applies to
pre-MMA ANDAs. See id.; see also Lietzan & Kom, supra note 15, at 65-66 (stating "the
2003 legislation is retroactive" with respect to this topic).
63. See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 47
(2002). A district court case averages twenty-five months and an appeal averages twelve
months; therefore, estimated timing for reaching a final court decision is thirty-seven
months. See id.
64. Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1357; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2000).
65. See Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1357 (citing Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
289 F.3d 775, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.8.
66. See supra note 15 (discussing when the MMA applies and its grandfather provision).
67. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.9; see also Lietzan & Kom, supra note 15, at 65.
Additionally, if there are multiple First Paragraph IV ANDA Filers, "the first applicant to
commercially launch triggers the exclusivity as to all first applicants." See UPADHYE, supra
note 51, § 13.9.
1086 [Vol. 78
APPROVAL BOTTLENECK
events. 68 There are six events that could lead to a forfeiture of the 180-day
exclusivity: (1) failure to market; (2) withdrawal of application; (3)
amendment of certification; (4) failure to obtain tentative approval; (5)
agreement with another applicant, the listed drug application holder, or a
patent owner; and (6) expiration of all patents. 69 Of particular importance
to the "approval bottleneck" problem are the failure-to-market forfeiture
provision, the agreement forfeiture provision, and the amendment-of-
certification forfeiture provision.
The failure-to-market forfeiture event is complex and includes aspects of
the pre-MMA court-decision trigger. The statute reads as follows:
(I) FAILURE To MARKET.-The first applicant fails to market the drug
by the later of-
(aa) the earlier of the date that is-
(AA) 75 days after the date on which the approval of the application
of the first applicant is made effective under subparagraph (B)(iii); or
(BB) 30 months after the date of submission of the application of the
first applicant; or
(bb) with respect to the first applicant or any other applicant (which other
applicant has received tentative approval), the date that is 75 days after
the date as of which, as to each of the patents with respect to which the
first applicant submitted and lawfully maintained a certification
qualifying the first applicant for 180-day exclusivity period under
subparagraph (B)(iv), at least 1 of the following has occurred:
(AA) In an infringement action brought against that applicant with
respect to the patent or in a declaratory judgment action brought by
that applicant with respect to the patent, a court enters a final decision
from which no appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken that the patent is invalid
or not infringed.
(BB) In an infringement action or a declaratory judgment action
described in subitem (AA), a court signs a settlement order or consent
decree that enters a final judgment that includes a finding that the
patent is invalid or not infringed.
(CC) The patent information submitted under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section is withdrawn by the holder of the application approved
under subsection (b) of this section.70
68. See Lietzan & Kom, supra note 15, at 65 ("Although Congress eliminated the court
decision trigger for beginning the period of exclusivity, it established a new court decision
trigger for forfeiture of exclusivity."); see also UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 13.9.
69. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(D) (2006); UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 14.2-3, 14.11-
.13, 14.16-17. Forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity requires just any one of the six events
to occur. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D).
70. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
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The failure-to-market forfeiture provision attempts to prevent the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer from indefinitely "parking" its exclusivity by
having the applicant forfeit its 180-day exclusivity if "it fails to market its
product by the later of two statutorily defined dates," the (aa) date or the
(bb) date. 71 While the application may seem straightforward, complications
can arise, as illustrated by the Teva granisetron hydrochloride situation.72
In the Teva application process, there was no (bb) date because no
infringement litigation was brought. 73 The absence of a (bb) date left a gap
in the forfeiture date calculations, which led to an FDA review and
ultimately a decision that exclusivity was not forfeited.74
The second forfeiture provision of interest, the amendment-of-
certification forfeiture provision, calls for forfeiture if the First Paragraph
IV ANDA Filer amends the Paragraph IV "certification for all of the patents
with respect to which that applicant submitted [such] a certification. '75 The
statute reads as follows:
(III) AMENDMENT OF CERTIFICATION.-The first applicant amends or
withdraws the certification for all of the patents with respect to which that
applicant submitted a certification qualifying the applicant for the 180-day
exclusivity period. 76
71. See Bickart, supra note 27, at 8-71.
72. See Teva North America, FDA Decision Letter: ANDA 77-165: Granisetron
Hydrochloride Injection, I mg/mL, Docket No. 2007N-0389 (Jan. 17, 2008) [hereinafter
Granisetron Letter], available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/DOCKETS/07n0389/
07n-0389-1et0003.pdf.
73. See id. at 5.
74. See id. Teva was first to file a Paragraph IV ANDA for granisetron hydrochloride
injection on June 1, 2004. Id. at 1. The ANDA contained a Paragraph IV certification as to
one patent and a Paragraph III certification as to the second patent, which meant FDA could
not approve the ANDA until the expiration of the second patent on December 29, 2007. Id.
at 4. The date for (aa) is the earlier of(1) seventy-five days after the first applicant's ANDA
is approved, which would not occur until approximately seventy-five days after December
29, 2007; or (2) thirty months after the submission of the ANDA, which is December 1,
2006. See id. Therefore the earlier date is December 1, 2006. See id. Forfeiture does not
occur unless the applicant fails to market by the later date of (aa), which is December 1,
2006, or (bb). See id. at 3-4. However, there was no lawsuit brought against Teva regarding
its Paragraph IV certification as to the one patent, nor was there a lawsuit brought against
any subsequent ANDA filers. See id. at 5. Therefore there is no (bb) date. See id. An
argument was made that since there is no later date, forfeiture should occur by the failing to
market by the (aa) date. See id. This argument was rejected and therefore Teva was entitled
to keep its 180-day exclusivity. See id. at 7. A consequence of this ruling by the FDA is that
it gives rise to concerns about "parking" exclusivity because without a (bb) date, Teva can
choose not to launch its product upon approval and still not forfeit its 180-day exclusivity,
preventing subsequent ANDA filers from gaining FDA approval unless they themselves
either are sued or bring a declaratory judgment action and create a (bb) date, which may then
lead to possible forfeiture. See id. at 6. See generally infra Part II.
75. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(1I). "[I]f the first applicant amends or withdraws its
[P]aragraph IV certification for all of the patents as to which it made such a certification,"
qualifying it for the 180-day exclusivity, the applicant forfeits its 180-day exclusivity. See
Bickart, supra note 27, at 8-73.
76. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(ItI).
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To aid in the application of the amendment-of-certification forfeiture
provision, the FDA has provided additional guidance regarding
amendments to certification as it relates to settlements. The FDA takes the
position that despite settling with the innovator company, the ANDA filer
does not need to amend its Paragraph IV certification and, therefore, the
First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer is still entitled to its 180-day exclusivity.7 7
This decision contributes to the creation of "approval bottlenecks," as
discussed in Part II.
The third forfeiture provision of interest, the agreement forfeiture
provision calls for a forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity if the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer enters an agreement that violates antitrust
laws. 78 The statute reads as follows:
(V) AGREEMENT WITH ANOTHER APPLICANT, THE LISTED DRUG
APPLICATION HOLDER, OR A PATENT OWNER.-The first applicant enters
into an agreement with another applicant under this subsection for the
drug, the holder of the application for the listed drug, or an owner of the
patent that is the subject of the certification under paragraph
(2)(A)(vii)(IV), the Federal Trade Commission or the Attorney General
files a complaint, and there is a final decision of the Federal Trade
Commission or the court with regard to the complaint from which no
appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari)
has been or can be taken that the agreement has violated the antitrust laws
(as defined in section 12 of title 15, except that the term includes section
45 of title 15 to the extent that that section applies to unfair methods of
competition).79
To clarify, if the ANDA filer enters an agreement that either the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) or a court finds to violate federal antitrust laws,
and the decision is either not appealed or cannot be appealed, the ANDA
filer's 180-day exclusivity is forfeited.8 0 Due the importance of preventing
antitrust violations, and in order to better police any possible violations,
Congress went one step further by requiring almost all agreements between
Paragraph IV ANDA filers and the innovator drug companies (NDA holder
or patent owner) or other competing applicants to be filed with the Assistant
Attorney General and the FTC. 81 Given the length of time to reach a
77. See FDA Decision Letter: Ramipril Capsules, Docket No. 2007N-0382 (Jan. 29,
2008) [hereinafter Ramipril Letter], available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/
DOCKETS/07n0382/07n-0382-let6.pdf. In the citizen petition the FDA stated that, despite
settling with the innovator company, the ANDA applicant does not need to amend its
Paragraph IV certification and therefore the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer is still entitled
to its 180-day exclusivity. See id. "Consequently, despite the fact [of] the settlement
agreement . . . there is no legal basis for the [FDA] to find that [the First Paragraph IV
ANDA Filer] has forfeited its exclusivity." See id.
78. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V).
79. See id.
80. See Bickart, supra note 27, at 8-73 to 8-74.
81. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461-63 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 note) (Federal
Trade Commission Review); Bickart, supra note 27, at 8-73.
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nonappealable decision, however, it will probably be unlikely that forfeiture
of the 180-day exclusivity will occur due to a collusive agreement,
suggesting this provision has "no teeth."'82
The other three forfeiture provisions-Withdrawal of Application,
Failure to Obtain Tentative Approval, and Expiration of All Patents-are an
important part of the MMA's attempt to alleviate abuses of the Hatch-
Waxman Act but are not as important to the "approval bottleneck"
situation. 83
B. Declaratory Judgments
Part I.B provides a background on declaratory judgments and explains
how declaratory judgments relate to the Hatch-Waxman Act. Part 1.B. 1
provides an overview of declaratory judgments. Part I.B.2 addresses the
role declaratory judgments play within the Hatch-Waxman Act (i.e., "civil
action to obtain patent certainty"). Part I.B.3 discusses the reasonable-
apprehension-of-suit test, the previous test used to determine whether a
declaratory judgment action shall proceed or be dismissed for lack of
82. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 14.16.
This provision while verbose has no teeth because it will never happen .... It
has no teeth because the forfeit will only occur after a ridiculously long period of
time .... It requires that the FTC or Justice Department to have prosecuted the
antitrust case through appeal. Given that the administrative proceeding at FTC
could take years, plus appeals court review, this provision simply is so watered
down that [while] facially it seems good, it has no teeth.
Id.
83. For completeness, a discussion of the three provisions follows. "(II) WITHDRAWAL
OF APPLICATION.-The first applicant withdraws the application or the Secretary considers
the application to have been withdrawn as a result of a determination by the Secretary that
the application does not meet the requirements for approval under paragraph (4)." 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(II). Two factors can lead to forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity in this
provision. If the first applicant withdraws its ANDA, the exclusivity is forfeited. Bickart,
supra note 27, at 8-72. Additionally, if the FDA determines that the applicant's ANDA
cannot satisfy FDA's safety and efficacy requirements, the applicant's 180-day exclusivity is
also forfeited. See id.
The next forfeiture event is
(IV) FAILURE TO OBTAIN TENTATIVE APPROVAL.-The first applicant fails to
obtain tentative approval of the application within 30 months after the date on
which the application is filed, unless the failure is caused by a change in or a
review of the requirements for approval of the application imposed after the date
on which the application is filed.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV). Tentative approval means the ANDA meets all FDA
requirements for approval but cannot receive final approval due to another applicant's
exclusivity. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(dd)(AA). The FDA had previously required a First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer to actively pursue its ANDA, otherwise it risked losing its 180-
day exclusivity. See Bickart, supra note 27, at 8-72. However, there was no time limit for an
ANDA applicant to resolve any issues raised by the FDA. See id. The new provisions
provide for a thirty month time limit to obtain tentative FDA approval or the First Paragraph
IV ANDA Filer forfeits its 180-day exclusivity provided there is no change in requirements.
See id.
The last forfeiture event is "(VI) ExPIRATION OF ALL PATENTS.-All of the patents as to
which the applicant submitted a certification qualifying it for the 180-day exclusivity period
have expired." 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI).
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subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, Part I.B.4 discusses the all-the-
circumstances test from the 2007 MedImmune decision, a newer test,
utilized to evaluate whether declaratory judgment actions shall proceed.
1. Overview of Declaratory Judgments
In addition to the changes in the 180-day exclusivity, which include the
new forfeiture provisions, the MMA created a newfound significance of
declaratory judgments in the Hatch-Waxman/ANDA litigation setting.84
Declaratory judgments "allow a party to sue another party to... clear up a
lurking legal issue." 85  Declaratory judgments are governed by federal
statute. The relevant text of the federal statute states, "In a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction... any court of the United States, upon
the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought."'86  The statute requires "actual
controversy" for a declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court has
affirmed that the "actual controversy" requirement of the Declaratory
Judgment Act requires that the cases or controversies be sufficient to satisfy
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, 87 which specifies judicial power.88
2. Civil Action To Obtain Patent Certainty
Part I.B. 1 provided a brief overview of declaratory judgments. To bring
it back to the Hatch-Waxman context, "a potential infringer [ANDA filer]
may wish to ASK FOR A [declaratory judgment] against the patentee
[innovator] to clear up the issue of whether the infringer is indeed
infringing," 89 which is where the "civil action to obtain patent certainty"
provision is utilized.90 MMA's civil action to obtain patent certainty
provision was "designed to prevent patentees [or NDA holders] from
'gaming' the Hatch-Waxman Act" through the use of tactics to delay
generic competition. 91 Civil action to obtain patent certainty provides for
an early resolution of patent disputes. The provision allows any ANDA
filer to file a declaratory judgment action against the patentee or NDA
holder for a "declaratory judgment that the [relevant Orange Book listed]
patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the [generic] drug for which the
84. See id. § 355(j)(5)(C).
85. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 15.1.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
87. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 771 (2007) ("[T]he phrase
'case of actual controversy' in the Act refers to the type of 'Cases' and 'Controversies' that
are justiciable under Article III." (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240
(1937))).
88. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
89. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 15.1.
90. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(C) (2006).
91. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1342 & n.7
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
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[ANDA] applicant seeks approval."'92 While this is an MMA provision, the
civil action to obtain patent certainty provision has been applied to pre-
MMA ANDAs.93 In order to bring a declaratory judgment action, the civil
action to obtain patent certainty provision requires that (1) forty-five days
have passed since the Paragraph IV notice was received by the patentee or
NDA holder, (2) no patent infringement suit has been brought (or a patent
infringement suit has been brought on some but not all the Orange Book
listed patents, against which the ANDA filer filed a Paragraph IV
certification), and (3) the ANDA filer provided the patentee and NDA
holder an offer of confidential access. 94 Once these requirements are met, a
judge must determine if there is a sufficient Article III case or controversy
to allow the declaratory judgment action to proceed. 95  The ultimate
question is one of subject matter jurisdiction, which is a court's power
"over the nature of the case aad the type of relief sought; the extent to
which a court can rule on. .. the status of things."9 6 Without a sufficient
case or controversy, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case
and must grant a moving party's motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.9 7 The court often utilizes a test, as will be discussed in
Parts I.B.3 and I.B.4, to determine whether there is sufficient controversy to
allow the declaratory judgment action to proceed.
92. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(II); Novartis, 482 F.3d at 1342; Dey, L.P. v.
Sepracor, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 355, 358 (D. Del. 2009) ("To further facilitate the ability of
subsequent ANDA filers to obtain a court judgment of non-infringement or invalidity of the
NDA holder's Orange Book patents, Congress extended the relevant federal court
declaratory judgment jurisdiction ....").
93. See generally Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
94. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i); Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 6-7, Janssen
Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-1062).
If a patent infringement suit is brought within forty-five days with regards to some but
not all of the patents of the listed drug, against which a Paragraph IV certification was made,
a declaratory judgment action may still proceed regarding the other patents not subject to the
infringement suit. See, e.g., Novartis, 482 F.3d 1330. Novartis had listed five patents in the
Orange Book covering the listed drug Famvir. See id. at 1334. Teva had filed an ANDA
with a Paragraph IV certification as to all five patents. See id. Within forty-five days,
Novartis had brought a patent infringement suit against Teva with respect to only one of the
five patents. See id. at 1334-35. As a result, Teva had filed a declaratory judgment to obtain
patent certainty with respect to the remaining four patents. See id. at 1335. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action
and allowed the declaratory judgment to proceed. See id. at 1346.
The offer of confidential access allows the NDA holder or patentee to "review the
[ANDA] application for the .... purpose of evaluating possible infringement of the patent"
subject to Paragraph IV certification. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(III); see supra notes 41-44
and accompanying text (discussing the notice which must be provided by a Paragraph IV
ANDA filer to the patentee and NDA holder).
95. See supra Part I.B.1.
96. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004).
97. See generally Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 768-69 (2007).
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3. Reasonable-Apprehension-of-Suit Test
Prior to the 2007 MedImmune decision, the courts utilized a two-part
reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test in the Hatch-Waxman setting in order
to determine whether the declaratory judgment action presents a sufficient
Article III controversy to permit the declaratory judgment action to
proceed.98  Under the reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test, sufficient
controversy exists if there is both
(1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee which creates a
reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff
[ANDA filer] that it will face an infringement suit; and (2) present
activity by the declaratory judgment plaintiff [ANDA filer] which could
constitute infringement, or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct
such activity. 99
ANDA filers seeking a declaratory judgment action against the patent/NDA
holder would often run into difficulties passing the first prong of this
stringent test and, therefore, would be denied declaratory judgment.100 The
stringent reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test soon gave way to the more
lenient all-the-circumstances test.
4. All-the-Circumstances Test
In MedImmune, the Supreme Court disagreed with the validity of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's reasonable-apprehension-of-
suit test. 10 1 The Court eliminated the test's validity in a footnote and went
on to discuss the all-the-circumstances test. 10 2 The all-the-circumstances
test is a more flexible test, which states that "the question in each case is
whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
98. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("This court has developed a two-part inquiry to determine whether there is an actual
controversy in a suit requesting a declaration of patent non-infringement or invalidity.").
The test was further evolved to the reasonable-apprehension-of-imminent-suit test. See id. at
1333.
99. See id. at 1332.
100. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 15.3. A Paragraph IV ANDA filer by undertaking
the ANDA process, subjecting itself to Paragraph IV lawsuits and making a generic drug
upon ANDA approval, has generally done enough activity to satisfy part (2) of the
reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test. See id. An ANDA filer's declaratory judgment actions,
when they do fail, do so because of part (1). See id. If some Orange Book patents are sued
upon and others are not, then there is not much apprehension of suit as to the unlitigated
patents. See id. Furthermore, if an innovator company provides an ANDA filer a covenant
not to sue with respect to the unlitigated patents there is "even less apprehension of a suit."
See id.
101. See MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774 n. 11 (noting that the reasonable-apprehension-of-
suit test conflicts with several Supreme Court cases and that "eliminating any apprehension
of suit, does not moot a declaratory judgment counterclaim of patent invalidity").
102. See id. at 771, 774 n.l1.
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judgment." 103 There is no longer a need for reasonable apprehension, and
as such the declaratory judgment plaintiff is not required to "bet the
farm... by taking the violative action." 10 4  The consequence of
establishing a test with a lower threshold is an increase in the number of
declaratory judgment challenges. 10 5 The Supreme Court did, however,
emphasize "that the dispute [must still] be 'definite and concrete, touching
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests'; and that ... [the
dispute] be 'real and substantial' and 'admi[t] of specific relief through a
decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts."' 0 6 The
implication of a more relaxed test is that it is another tool in overcoming the
"approval bottleneck."' 0 7
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides for an accelerated drug approval
process for a generic version of the listed drug. To further encourage the
introduction of generic versions, the Hatch-Waxman Act also provides for a
180-day exclusivity to the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer. 108 However, if
the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer, which has been granted the 180-day
exclusivity period, settles with the innovator company or takes other actions
that result in delaying the launch of its generic version, the Hatch-Waxman
side effect, an "approval bottleneck," occurs. This "approval bottleneck"
blocks Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers from gaining approval, 10 9
potentially causing an indefinite delay in access to generic drugs.
C. "Approval Bottleneck"
While somewhat complex, the Hatch-Waxman Act attempts to balance
the interests of both innovator and generic pharmaceutical companies."It 0
However, an undesired side effect can arise through the operation of the
Hatch-Waxman Act: the "approval bottleneck." Innovator companies have
103. Id. at 771 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
104. Id. at 772 (citing Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216 (1923)).
The flexibility of the new test can be illustrated through the case Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. See supra note 94 (discussing the Novartis
case). The district court in the case bound by the reasonable-apprehension-of-imminent-suit
test dismissed the declaratory judgment suit for lack of jurisdiction. See Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1342 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also supra
note 100 (noting how suing on some patents but not on others is less likely to create a
reasonable apprehension). However, the Federal Circuit applied the more flexible all-the-
circumstances test and held there was sufficient controversy to confer jurisdiction when an
innovator sues on one, but not the other, Orange Book listed patents for the listed drug. See
Novartis, 482 F.3d at 1334-35, 1346.
105. Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for Evaluating
Patent Litigants' Access to the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 407, 442
(2007).
106. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227, 240-41 (1937)).
107. See infra Part II.
108. See supra Part I.A.
109. See infra Part I.C.
110. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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strong incentives to prevent generic competition with its listed drug since
generic versions sell at "substantially lower prices than their brand-name
[innovator] counterparts," resulting in substantial loss of revenue to the
innovator company."' One way to prevent, or at least delay, generic
competition is for the innovator company to enter into a settlement
agreement with the generic company. 112  Furthermore, if the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer (entitled to its 180-day exclusivity) settles with
the innovator company, an "approval bottleneck" may result because no
other generic company may obtain FDA approval until the First Paragraph
IV ANDA Filer's 180-day exclusivity is exhausted. 13  However,
exhaustion of the exclusivity may be delayed, into the distant future, as a
result of the settlement. 114 This "approval bottleneck" effectively prevents
Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers from obtaining FDA approval,
delaying generic entrants into the marketplace.
To further clarify, a settlement between the First Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer and the innovator removes an opportunity for the commercial-
marketing trigger, as the settlement agreement would call for a delay in
generic entry."15 The settlement also removes the opportunity for a court-
decision trigger by the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's own litigation
because the settlement ended the litigation proceedings. 116 "Without the
occurrence of either triggering event, the [Subsequent Paragraph IV
ANDA] [F]iler is stuck" since the FDA cannot approve the Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's applications until the expiration of the 180-day
exclusivity of the first applicant.' 17 Therefore, an "approval bottleneck" is
created. Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers cannot be approved by the
FDA until the 180-day exclusivity for the first applicant is exhausted. 118
However, the first applicant will not exhaust the 180-day exclusivity until
180-days after the generic launch date specified by the settlement, which
111. See Frank, supra note 1, at 1993.
112. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
113. See Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1586-89; Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in the
Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Part III, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 377, 381-82
(2007) ("A settlement with the first challenger will avoid ... [the risk of a patent being
declared invalid], and under the applicable rules, it will block entry by later generics until
180 days after the first generic actually enters."). Leary further states that "Hatch-Waxman
settlements can block later generic challenges" and "[aifter the pioneer settles with the first
challenger for an extended entry delay, it can safely ignore the threat of additional generic
entry." See id. at 382, 389. These statements assumed that a declaratory judgment could not
be brought by subsequent ANDA filers given that the previous test, the reasonable-
apprehension-of-imminent-suit test, was the standard to be applied instead of the current all-
the-circumstances test. See id. at 389 n.60.
114. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
115. See Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1568 ("The basic settlement structure is simple ....
The generic firm abstains from entry ... and the parties agree to dismiss the patent suit.");
see also supra Part I.A.3.
116. See supra note 115.
117. See Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1587-89; see supra Part I.A.3.
118. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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the innovator company will try to push as far into the future as possible." 19
This "approval bottleneck" is solely a side effect of the statutory application
of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer actions
have also been referred to as "parking"'120 the 180-day exclusivity.
The First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer would agree to such settlements
delaying launch of its own generic version for reasons such as (1) a
payment by the innovator company as part of the settlement; (2) saving
litigation costs, especially if the litigation costs are greater than any added
benefit of launching now versus waiting until the settlement date; or (3)
uncertainty as to the probability of winning its patent litigation case and the
settlement provides for a launch at a specified date that is prior to the
expiration of the listed drug's patents. 121  As a further incentive to
settlement, the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer still retains its 180-day
exclusivity when it settles. 122 However, when an "approval bottleneck"
situation arises, there are limited actions a Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer can take in order to defeat the parking of exclusivity by the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer. As mentioned in Part I.A.3, "[S]ubsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA [F]ilers can trigger the first Paragraph IV ANDA
filer's 180-day exclusivity period via a successful court judgment" (pre-
MMA) or cause forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity (post-MMA).123 If the
First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer has parked its exclusivity, "[S]ubsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA [F]ilers have a strong incentive to generate a
triggering" or forfeiture event (e.g., a court decision) clearing the path to the
FDA's approval of the subsequent ANDAs. 124
Innovator companies, conversely, "have a strong incentive to prevent a
[court decision] triggering event" or forfeiture event by any Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer.125 Innovator companies instead prefer the 180-
day exclusivity not to begin until commercial marketing of the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's generic version of the listed drug on the date
specified by the settlement. 126  This effectively blocks all generic
competition until the settlement launch date. Therefore, innovator
119. See Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
("Some brand name drug manufacturers have succeeded in 'parking' 180-day marketing
exclusivity period, indefinitely delaying ANDA approvals and bottlenecking the market.
'Parking' occurs when the brand name manufacturer convinces the first filer not to enter the
market, often through a settlement agreement concluding a patent infringement suit. Absent
an intervening court decision, the first filer's failure to enter the market delays the triggering
of the 180-day exclusivity period so that it neither begins nor ends, and subsequently filed
ANDAs cannot be approved." (citations omitted)).
120. See id.
121. See Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1568, 1574, 1588-89.
122. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
123. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(citing Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 289 F.3d 775, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2002));
see supra Part I.A.3.
124. See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
125. See id.; supra Part I.A.3.
126. See supra Part I.A.3.
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companies have "a strong incentive to avoid litigation" with Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filers, which could potentially trigger the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's 180-day exclusivity (pre MMA) or cause
forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity (post MMA) prior to the settlement
launch date. 127 A final court decision in the suit with the Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer, before the settlement launch date, stating that
the listed drug's patents are invalid or will not be infringed, would trigger
exclusivity or possible forfeiture of exclusivity prior to the settlement
launch date. 128
Therefore, if an innovator company can prevent a "[S]ubsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA [F]iler's court challenge, it can delay FDA approval
of the subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA and thus delay the [S]ubsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA [F]iler's [generic] entry into the market" until after
the settlement launch date.129 Thus, innovator companies would either not
sue Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers, or sue them for patent
infringement only as to one or a few Orange Book patents for the listed
drug, as opposed to all of the patents, in order to avoid overcoming the
"approval bottleneck."' 130 Suing on one or a few patents does not overcome
the "approval bottleneck" because, in order to trigger the exclusivity or
forfeiture of the exclusivity, a Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer needs
a court decision of invalidity or noninfringement with respect to all patents
first subject to Paragraph IV certification by the First Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer. 131 Some innovator companies have gone one step further to prevent
any litigation with Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers; they have
127. See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1284; see supra Part I.A.3.
128. See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1284; see supra Part I.A.3.
129. See Caraco, 527 F.3dat 1285.
130. See, e.g., Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1357-59
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that Janssen, innovator, sued Apotex, Subsequent Paragraph IV
ANDA Filer, on only one of the three patents with Paragraph IV certification); Caraco, 527
F.3d at 1288 (noting that Forrest, innovator, sued Caraco, Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer, for patent infringement on only one of the two patents with Paragraph IV certification
by Caraco); Dey, L.P. v. Sepracor, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 355, 358 (D. Del. 2009) (noting that
Sepracor, innovator, sued Dey, Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer, on only five out of
the six patents with Paragraph IV certification by Dey); Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 385 F.
Supp. 2d 187, 190, 190-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that Pfizer, innovator, sued IVAX the
First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer but did not sue Apotex, Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer).
131. See supra Part I.A.3; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb) (2006) (noting that a
court decision is needed "as to each of the patents with respect to which the first applicant
submitted and lawfully maintained a certification qualifying the first applicant for the 180-
day exclusivity"); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) (2000) (amended 2003) (noting that a
court decision is needed for any "patent which is the subject of the certification to be invalid
or not infringed"); Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1288 (noting that "only a judgment of invalidity or
noninfringement with respect to both.., patents can trigger [the First Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer's] exclusivity period," since the applicant was first to file a Paragraph IV certification
with respect to both patents covering the innovator's product).
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provided a covenant not to sue to the Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA
Filers on the patents subject to Paragraph IV certification.1 32
II. EVOLUTION OF LAW THAT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ADDRESSES
CONQUERING THE "APPROVAL BOTTLENECK"
Part I provided an overview of the drug approval process and its
undesired side effect-the approval bottleneck. Part I also briefly discussed
the struggle between innovator companies and Subsequent Paragraph IV
ANDA Filers in dealing with the approval bottleneck. Part II expands the
approval bottleneck discussion and discusses the evolution of law that
directly or indirectly addresses the approval bottleneck, as well as efforts to
conquer it. The laws range from case decisions, such as Medlmmune,
Caraco, and Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 13 3 to statutes,
such as the MMA.
A. Subsequent ANDA Filers Can Trigger the Exclusivity
The first step taken towards conquering the approval bottleneck was a
court's decision to provide Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers with an
ability to play a role in effecting the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's 180-
day exclusivity. 134 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Barr
Laboratories took a crucial step in overcoming the approval bottleneck by
stating that Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers can trigger the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's 180-day exclusivity via a successful court
judgment. 135
B. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003
The MMA was originally considered by many to be a permanent solution
to the approval bottleneck problem. However, as Part II.B will explain, the
approval bottleneck, while mitigated, still remains. Part II.B. 1 addresses
the forfeiture provisions and their attempt to eliminate the approval
bottleneck. Part II.B.2 discusses the civil action to obtain patent certainty
provision and its mechanism to overcome the approval bottleneck.
However, as also will be discussed in Part II.B.2, the civil action provision
132. See, e.g., Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1358 (noting that Apotex, a Subsequent Paragraph IV
ANDA Filer, filed Paragraph IV certifications with respect to three patents but was sued
only with respect to the one patent and provided a covenant not to sue with respect to the
remaining two patents); Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1289 (noting that Forest, the innovator,
unilaterally granted Caraco, a subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filer, an irrevocable covenant
not to sue for infringement of the '941 patent); Dey, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 358 (noting that
Sepracor, innovator, sued Dey, Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer, on only five out of
the six patents with Paragraph IV certification by Dey and provided a covenant not to sue on
the '289 patent); see also infra Part II.D.
133. 540 F.3d 1353.
134. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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has its shortcomings and was fairly inoperable until the 2007 MedImmune
decision.
1. MMA Forfeiture Provisions
The prevailing wisdom after the passing of the MMA was that it had
solved the approval bottleneck problem. 136 This notion likely was a result
of the establishment of the forfeiture provisions. 137 However, after some
time has passed to digest the MMA, further analysis suggests that the
possibility of the approval bottleneck still remains. 138 "Like, the old rules,
[the MMA] permit[s] a brand-name firm to neutralize the first filer's
challenge through settlement .... And the new rules still contain a
bottleneck."1 39
First, the agreement forfeiture provision may have suggested that an
approval bottleneck was not possible because a settlement by the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer, that either the FTC or a court finds to violate
federal antitrust laws, leads to the forfeiture of the First Paragraph IV
ANDA Filer's 180-day exclusivity, which clears the path for Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filers to gain FDA approval. 140 This provision,
however, has "no teeth" because it requires the FTC or Justice Department
to have prosecuted the antitrust case through appeal, as a nonappealable
decision is required to cause a forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity; the
FTC administrative proceeding can take years, and one must add the time
required for appeals court review. 141
To recap, because the FDA is prevented from approving a Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer until the 180-day exclusivity is exhausted or
forfeited, the settlement creates an approval bottleneck. The 180-day
exclusivity will not be exhausted because the settlement delays launch of
the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's generic drug. The exclusivity will not
136. See Apotex, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 190 ("The Medicare Amendments established
forfeiture provisions to prevent bottlenecking ...."); Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1587 &
n.143 ("[T]he bottleneck does not apply to filings made after December 2003. Due to a
statutory change, to simplify greatly a complicated scheme, FDA approval of those later-
filed ANDA-IVs generally cannot be long delayed on account of a settlement between the
innovator and a first-filing generic firm.").
137. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D) (2006); Apotex, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 190; see also supra
Part I.A.3.b.
138. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking To Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 659-60 (2009) ("The
MMA's passage led some to conclude that the settlement problem had been resolved. Five
years after the MMA's passage, however, there is little evidence that settlements ... have
become less popular.").
139. Id. at 660.
140. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
141. See UPADHYE, supra note 51, § 14.16; supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
"Congress did not provide for such a forfeiture as the result of any ... type of settlement"
with the innovator company other than a settlement agreement where "there is a final,
unappealable order finding that the terms of the agreement violate the federal antitrust laws."
Ramipril Letter, supra note 77.
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be forfeited in any reasonable time to diminish the harm from the approval
bottleneck because forfeiture may only occur at some time in the distant
future when and if a nonappealable decision of an antitrust violation has
been reached. As a result, the approval bottleneck's existence has not been
altered as a result of the agreement forfeiture provision.
Second, the amendment-of-certification forfeiture provision calls for
forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity if the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer
amends the Paragraph IV certification for all of the listed patents. 142 The
rationale was that if the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer enters into a
settlement with the innovator company, it must amend its Paragraph IV
certification because the certification is no longer valid. If the Paragraph IV
certifications are amended, the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer forfeits its
180-day exclusivity. 143 However, in a letter issued by the FDA, the FDA
stated that despite settling with the innovator company, the ANDA Filer
does not need to amend its Paragraph IV certification, and, therefore, the
First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer is still entitled to its 180-day exclusivity. 144
Third, the failure-to-market forfeiture provision attempts to prevent the
First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer from indefinitely "parking" its exclusivity
by having the applicant forfeit its 180-day exclusivity if "it fails to market
its product by the later of two statutorily defined dates," the (aa) date or the
(bb) date. 145 However, this provision also has shortcomings. The (aa) date
is the earlier of seventy-five days after the First Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer's ANDA is approved, or thirty months after the submission of the
ANDA. 146 The (bb) date is seventy-five days after any one of the following
three events: (1) a nonappealable court decision that all of the patents,
which the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer made a Paragraph IV
certification against, are invalid or not infringed (the court decision can
come from a patent infringement suit involving any ANDA Filer or a
declaratory judgment action by any ANDA filer); (2) a settlement, which
includes a judicial finding that all Paragraph IV certified patents, by the
First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer, are invalid or not infringed; or (3) the
innovator removes from the Orange Book all patents subject to the
Paragraph IV certification by the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer. 147
Determining the (aa) date and (bb) date is only half the formula because,
once again, forfeiture occurs if the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer fails to
market its product by the later of the (aa) date or the (bb) date. 148
If the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer settles with the innovator
company, the (aa) date will still occur, the earlier of seventy-five days after
the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's ANDA is approved, or thirty months
142. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part I.A.3.b.
144. See Ramipril Letter, supra note 77; supra note 77 and accompanying text.
145. See Bickart, supra note 27, at 8-71; see also supra notes 70-71 and accompanying
text.
146. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
147. See Bickart, supra note 27, at 8-71; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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after the submission of the ANDA. However, there will likely be no (bb)
date because there will be no court decision that the patents are invalid or
not infringed and, as the FDA stated in a letter, without a (bb) date, there is
no forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity because there is no later of (aa) or
(bb).14 9 Therefore an approval bottleneck still exists.
To summarize, the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer is allowed to delay
launching its generic version per the settlement with the innovator without
losing its 180-day exclusivity, which prevents subsequent ANDA
approvals. In order to create a (bb) date, and lead to a possible forfeiture of
the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's 180-day exclusivity, which clears the
path for Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers, the responsibility falls on
the Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers to obtain a nonappealable court
decision that the Orange Book listed patents are invalid or not infringed,
either in a patent infringement suit brought by the innovator company
against the Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer or through a declaratory
judgment action brought by the Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer
against the innovator. 150 The Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer has no
exclusivity incentive to overcome litigation costs, yet still needs to enter
litigation with the innovator in order to create a (bb) date and lead to a
possible forfeiture of the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's exclusivity, in
order to enter the market.
2. MMA Civil Action To Obtain Patent Certainty
One way Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers can enter a patent
litigation suit, in order to trigger the 180-day exclusivity or lead to a
forfeiture of the exclusivity, is through the civil action to obtain patent
certainty provision. 15' In order to prevent innovator companies from
"'gaming' the Hatch-Waxman Act by forestalling the resolution of patent
disputes with ANDA filers," the MMA allows for a civil action to obtain
patent certainty. 152
This provision allows any ANDA applicant to file a declaratory judgment
action against the innovator company, for a "declaratory judgment[,] that
the [relevant Orange Book listed] patent is invalid or will not be infringed
by the drug for which the applicant seeks approval," as long as the
requirements are met and there is a sufficient Article III case or
controversy. 153  Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers can bring a
149. Granisetron Letter, supra note 72; supra note 74 and accompanying text.
150. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(1) (2006).
151. Id. § 355(j)(5)(C).
152. See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (citing Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp, 482 F.3d 1330, 1342, 1342
n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see supra Part I.B. While this is an MMA provision, it has been
applied to pre-MMA ANDAs. See generally Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc.,
540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Caraco, 527 F.3d 1278.
153. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(II); Novartis, 482 F.3d at 1342; see also supra Part
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declaratory judgment action to determine that the relevant patents are
invalid or not infringed. 154 If victorious, the First Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer's 180-day exclusivity is triggered (pre MMA) or the failure to market
forfeiture provision is triggered (post MMA).15 5 The declaratory judgment,
therefore, overcomes a potentially indefinite approval bottleneck, which
hopefully will lead to FDA approval of the Subsequent Paragraph IV
ANDA Filer's generic drug sooner than if the Subsequent Paragraph IV
ANDA Filers had to wait until exhaustion of the 180-day exclusivity
following the settlement launch date. 156
C. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
Declaratory judgment can be used to overcome an approval bottleneck;
however, obtaining subject matter jurisdiction has proved to be a barrier to
accessing this process. 157 It was not until the 2007 MedImmune decision,
which relaxed the declaratory judgment test, that declaratory judgments
became a more viable option for Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers.158
Therefore, even though one option to conquer the approval bottleneck
existed conceptually in 2002 with Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.
v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., which allowed Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA
Filers to trigger the exclusivity of the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer, the
option previously lacked applicability due to the stringent reasonable-
apprehension-of-suit test. 159 While the option was assisted with the MMA,
which allowed a civil action to obtain patent certainty 160 (declaratory
judgments), forcing the innovator companies into a patent lawsuit, parties
could not take full advantage of the option until 2007 with the advent of the
more lenient, all-the-circumstances declaratory judgment test. 161 As the
law evolved to make it easier for Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers to
overcome the approval bottleneck, innovator companies went one step
154. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
155. See generally supra Part I.A.3-B.2.
156. See generally supra Part I.B. 1-C.
157. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 768-69 (2007); supra Part
I.B.2.
158. See supra Part I.B.4. The MMA provisions allow for declaratory judgments but the
actual controversy requirement must still be met. Prior to MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., it was difficult for an ANDA filer to satisfy the declaratory judgment test and meet the
requirement. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also Leary, supra note 113, at
389 n.60 ("Declaratory judgments are unavailable to these additional generic challengers if
the pioneer simply does not threaten to sue." (citing Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc.,
395 F.3d 1324, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). After MedImmune, it is easier to meet the burden to
allow a declaratory judgment action to proceed. See supra Part I.B.4; see also Novartis, 482
F.3d 1330, 1339-40, 1345-46 (stating that the district court, applying the pre-Medlmmune
standard, reasonable-apprehension-of-imminent-suit test, dismissed the declaratory judgment
action for lack of jurisdiction, but the Federal Circuit, applying the new MedImmune all-the-
circumstances test, reversed the dismissal).
159. See supra Part I.A.3, I.B.3.
160. See supra Part I.B.2.
161. See supra Part I.B.4.
1102 [Vol. 78
APPROVAL BOTTLENECK
further and provided a covenant not to sue as an attempt to remove subject
matter jurisdiction in the declaratory judgment action.
D. Covenants Not To Sue
As previously mentioned, innovator companies have "a strong incentive
to avoid litigation" with Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers to prevent
conquering of the approval bottleneck. 162 With the MMA, Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filers had the power of declaratory judgments and,
when combined with the more lenient MedImmune all-the-circumstances
test, declaratory judgments became a more viable option to deal with
innovator companies trying to avoid litigation. 163  Realizing the power
generic companies possessed to overcome the approval bottleneck,
innovator companies, which previously did not sue, at least not on all of
their patents subject to Paragraph IV certifications, went one step further by
providing a covenant not to sue to Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers
on all patents or any patents not sued upon. 164 A covenant is a "formal
agreement or promise."' 165 Innovator companies hoped the covenant not to
sue would prevent any declaratory judgment actions from proceeding,
assuming there would no longer exist sufficient Article III case or
controversy, and, therefore, any declaratory judgment actions brought by
the Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer would be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 166 It has been previously held in some cases
that covenants not to sue divest the court of jurisdiction over the declaratory
judgment action, which further propagates the approval bottleneck. 167
However, there are distinguishable characteristics from those cases as they
162. See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
2008); see supra Part I.C.
163. See supra Part II.A-C.
164. See supra note 132.
165. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 96, at 391.
166. See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1288-89. Caraco had filed a Paragraph IV certification as
to both the '712 and the '941 patent covering Forest's listed drug Lexapro but Forest chose
to only sue on the '712 patent. Id. However, Forest soon realized the new all-the-
circumstances test from MedImmune allowed the court in Novartis to find sufficient
controversy between the parties when Novartis sued on one but not all of the patents Teva
had filed a Paragraph IV certification on, and therefore "[a]fter the Novartis decision issued,
Forest unilaterally granted Caraco an irrevocable covenant not to sue for infringement" on
the '941 patent, which was previously not sued upon by Forest. Id. at 1288-89. Forest stated
that its intention was to confirm "that there was no case or controversy between the parties
regarding the '941 patent." Id. at 1289; see also supra Part I.B.
167. See, e.g., Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed. Cir.
1999) ("[A] covenant not to sue.., is sufficient to divest a trial court of jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action."); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d
1054, 1057-59 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Super Sack's "promise not to sue Chase on the '796 and
'652 patents" means "Chase can have no reasonable apprehension that it will face an
infringement suit on the '796 and '652 patents . . . [so] it fails to satisfy the first part of our
two-part test of justiciability."); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 101 F. Supp.
2d 1139, 1142 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("[I]t is well-established that a trial court may be divested or
deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over a particular patent claim if the patentee
covenants not to assert an infringement claim against a putative infringer ... ").
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"either have nothing to do with the Hatch-Waxman Act or were decided
under the now-discarded 'reasonable apprehension of suit' test." 168 This
distinction is important because MedImmune lowers the standard for
declaratory judgments. 169 Additionally, as for the non-Hatch-Waxman
patent infringement cases, "a covenant not to sue [still] allows the recipient
to enter the marketplace" at any time prior to judgment, unlike "in the
Hatch-Waxman context, [where] regardless of a covenant not to sue, a
generic drug manufacturer cannot enter the market without FDA approval,"
which cannot occur for Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers when there
is an unconquered approval bottleneck.170
After MedImmune, however, in the Hatch-Waxman setting, the treatment
of covenants not to sue seems unsettled, as it is a very new area. Small
nuances may make the difference as to whether or not a covenant not to sue
divests a court of subject matter jurisdiction, propagating the approval
bottleneck. 171 The court in Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v.
Forest Laboratories Inc. concluded that a covenant not to sue did not divest
the court of jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action because the
"action present[ed] an ongoing Article III case and controversy."' 172
However, in Janssen Pharmaceutica, N. V. v. Apotex, Inc., decided in the
same court about six months later, also a Hatch-Waxman case, the court
affirmed the dismissal of Apotex's declaratory judgment action.173 Janssen,
innovator company, sued Apotex, subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filer, on
one of the three patents covering the listed drug and provided a covenant
not to sue with respect to the two remaining patents. 174  To better
understand the nuances, an in-depth discussion of both Caraco and Janssen
follow.
In Caraco, Ivax, a generic company, was the First Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer against patents '712 and '941 covering Forest's (an innovator
company) listed drug Lexapro. 175 Ivax was, therefore, entitled to the 180-
day exclusivity period.' 76 Forest sued Ivax on the '712 patent but did not
sue on the '941 patent. ' 77 Forest also sued Caraco, a Subsequent Paragraph
IV ANDA Filer, on the '712 patent but not on the '941 patent.'
78
Ultimately, Forest had won its case against Ivax on the '712 patent, which
was decided to be valid and infringed, preventing Ivax from obtaining FDA
approval. 179 However, Ivax was still entitled to its 180-day exclusivity
168. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 9, Caraco, 527 F.3d 1278 (No. 07-1404).
169. See supra Part I.B.4.
170. See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1296.
171. See generally Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Caraco, 527 F.3d 1278.
172. See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1297.
173. Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1363-64.
174. See id. at 1357-59.
175. See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1286.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 1288.
179. Seeid. at 1286.
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because it was first to file a Paragraph IV certification as to the '941
patent, 180 and a generic company does not forfeit its 180-day exclusivity
unless it loses or amends its Paragraph IV certification with respect to all
subjected patents. 181 However, Ivax could not trigger its 180-day
exclusivity. Ivax could not utilize the court judgment trigger because "Ivax
ha[d] not obtained a judgment that both of Forest's... patents are invalid
or not infringed."' 182 Additionally, Ivax could not trigger its 180-day
exclusivity via the commercial-marketing trigger until expiration of the
'712 patent, which was five years out from when the court of appeals
affirmed infringement in 2007.183
Caraco, as a Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer, could not obtain
FDA approval until the expiration of the 180-day exclusivity, which Ivax
has no way of triggering in the near future. 184 This situation is no different
than one in which the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer enters into a
settlement with the innovator company, because in both situations there is
an approval bottleneck preventing the Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer from obtaining approval. If there had been a settlement, Ivax would
have chosen not to trigger its 180-day exclusivity via the commercial-
marketing trigger by delaying launch of its generic version until the
settlement date. There would be no court-decision trigger as the patent
infringement suit would have been dropped as a result of the settlement.
Therefore, with Ivax out of the picture, only Caraco has the ability to
conquer the approval bottleneck and trigger Ivax's exclusivity period before
the 2012 expiration date of the '712 patent, which is when Ivax can launch
and trigger its own exclusivity via the commercial-marketing trigger. 185
However, in order for Caraco to trigger Ivax's exclusivity, it must obtain a
court judgment that "both the '712 and '941 patents are invalid or not
infringed."' 186 Unfortunately, Forest did not sue Caraco regarding the '941
patent.187  Following the MedImmune decision and the Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.188 decision,
it should have been easy for Caraco to bring a declaratory judgment action
with respect to the '941 patent.189 However, in addition to not suing Caraco
on the '941 patent, Forest, realizing the weakness in its argument after the
Novartis decision, "granted Caraco an irrevocable covenant not to sue for
infringement of the '941 patent."1 90
180. Seeid. at 1286-87.
181. See supra note 56 (discussing loss of patent infringement case and its effect on
exclusivity).
182. See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1286.
183. See id. at 1286-87.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 1287.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1288.
188. 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
189. See supra note 94; see also supra Part I.B.4.
190. See Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1289.
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The district court, moved by the covenant not to sue, "ruled that there
was no Article III controversy and granted Forest's motion to dismiss."'191
The court of appeals, however, reversed the district court's decision and
held that Caraco's declaratory judgment action "presents an ongoing Article
III case and controversy."' 92 The Supreme Court's MedImmune decision
was important to the court of appeals in reaching its decision. 193 The
importance of MedImmune was supported by the fact that the court of
appeals noted that there was no indication the district court had considered
MedImmune in reaching its decision. 194 In applying Medlmmune's all-the-
circumstances test, the court in Caraco stated the following: (1) there is
injury-in-fact because, unlike a typical patent infringement case where an
infringer can enter the market, a covenant not to sue does not allow Caraco
to enter the marketplace because it prevents Caraco from overcoming the
approval bottleneck; 195 (2) the injury is traceable to Forest because
"Forest's listing of the . . . patents . . . effectively denies Caraco an
economic opportunity to enter the marketplace unless Caraco can obtain a
judgment that both those patents are invalid or not infringed,"' 196 and
therefore the '941 patent, as one of the two listed patents, is a barrier that
"deprives Caraco of an economic opportunity to compete"; 197 (3) Caraco's
injury is redressible by a favorable declaratory judgment that the '941
patent is invalid or not infringed, because then Caraco would only require a
favorable decision regarding the '712 patent, which Forest has already sued
on;198 (4) the action is ripe for judicial review because "additional factual
development would not advance the district court's ability to decide
Caraco's action for a declaratory judgment" and if Caraco does not infringe
the patent (or the patent is invalid) then "withholding court consideration of
Caraco's declaratory judgment action has the 'immediate and substantial
impact' of forestalling Caraco's ability to activate Ivax's exclusivity period
through the court-judgment trigger"; 199 and (5) the action is not moot
because unlike a typical patent case where the threat of suit may be the only
action preventing a competitor from entering into a marketplace, which a
covenant not to sue would solve, in Hatch-Waxman cases, generic
companies are prevented from entering the market until FDA approval,
which cannot occur despite Caraco being granted a covenant not to sue
because only a court judgment of noninfringement or invalidity on the '941
patent can trigger Ivax's exclusivity and clear the way for FDA approval of
Caraco's ANDA (assuming Caraco prevails on the '712 patent case). 200
191. See id. at 1290.
192. See id. at 1297.
193. See id. at 1290.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 1291-92
196. See id. at 1292.
197. See id. at 1293.
198. Seeid. at 1288, 1293.
199. See id. at 1295.
200. See id. at 1296-97.
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Therefore, in applying these factors, Caraco's declaratory judgment action
presented an Article III controversy according to the all-the-circumstances
test and was allowed to proceed.20 1 The court emphasized the fact that the
covenant not to sue "does not eliminate the controversy with Caraco,"
because the controversy, "Forest's actions effectively prevent[ing] the FDA
from approving Caraco's ANDA and thus exclud[ing] Caraco from the drug
market[,] ... can only be resolved by a judgment that determines whether
Forest's '941 patent is infringed [or invalid]. '20 2
In Janssen, Janssen's listed drug, Risperdal Oral Solution, is covered by
three patents '663, '425, and '587.203 Teva, a generic company, filed an
ANDA with a Paragraph III certification on patent '663, therefore waiting
for FDA approval until the '663 patent expires, and was the First Paragraph
IV ANDA Filer against the remaining two patents, '425 and '587.204 Teva
was therefore entitled to the 180-day exclusivity generated from being the
First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer as to those patents.20 5 Janssen did not sue
Teva on the '425 and '587 patents, allowing the FDA to approve Teva's
generic drug as soon as the '663 patent expires. 206  Teva's 180-day
exclusivity will begin as soon as Teva begins marketing its drug following
FDA approval.
Apotex, a Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer, filed Paragraph IV
certifications with respect to all three patents but was sued only with respect
to the '663 patent and provided a covenant not to sue with respect to the
'425 and '587 patents. 20 7 The facts thus far are very similar to the Caraco
case, with a Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer being blocked from
approval due to the approval bottleneck created by the First Paragraph IV
ANDA Filer waiting until a future date to launch its generic version.
However, in this case, the first Paragraph IV filer was waiting to launch as a
result of submitting a Paragraph III certification with respect to the '663
patent. The situation still results in the Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer possibly being delayed in obtaining approval as a result of a delayed
exhaustion of the 180-day exclusivity, assuming that the '663 patent is
invalid or not infringed. The exclusivity will not run until the expiration
date of the '663 patent unless a declaratory judgment action can proceed,
where a decision favorable to Apotex can trigger Teva's 180-day
exclusivity.
However, in contrast to Caraco, part way through the litigation Apotex
also "stipulated to the validity, infringement, and enforceability of the '663
201. See id. at 1297.
202. See id.
203. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
204. See id. at 1358.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
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patent. '208  The court once again stated that the MedImmune all-the-
circumstances test dictates whether there is a "justiciable declaratory
judgment action. ' 20 9 In applying the test, the court noted that declaratory
judgment jurisdiction must be present during all stages of the court's review
of the case, "'not merely at the time the complaint is filed.' ' 210 In Janssen,
"the harm that created a justiciable Article III controversy in Caraco was
present when Apotex filed its [declaratory judgment action]... [but] that
harm ceased to exist upon Apotex's stipulation" of validity of the '663
patent.211  Had there been no stipulation, "Caraco would have been
controlling. 21 2 By stipulating to the '663 patent, even if Apotex were to
successfully invalidate the '425 and '527 patents in the declaratory
judgment action, it still would not be able to obtain FDA approval until the
expiration of the '663 patent.213 Therefore, the court stated that the only
harm that remains for Apotex is Teva's 180-day exclusivity, which will be
triggered with Teva's commercial marketing upon the expiration of the '663
patent. 214  The exclusivity, by itself, is not a "cognizable Article III
controversy" but an incentive provided to generic companies by the Hatch-
Waxman Act.2 15 Furthermore the court stated that Apotex's ANDA can be
approved on the 181st day after expiration of the '663, and, at that time,
Apotex can launch its product without fear of suit by Janssen as to the
remaining two patents because Apotex has been granted a covenant not to
sue with respect to them.216
However, without a declaratory judgment, there is the possibility of some
harm to Apotex and of delayed access to multiple generics of Risperdal
Oral Solution. Apotex had argued that Teva may not launch upon
expiration of the '663 patent, which would cause an indefinite delay in the
approval of Apotex's ANDA.217 The indefinite delay in approval of
Apotex's ANDA would be the result of (1) a lack of commercial-marketing
trigger of the 180-day exclusivity, if Teva happens to delay its launch; and
(2) the lack of a court-decision trigger of the 180-day exclusivity, if a
declaratory judgment action is not allowed to proceed with respect to the
two patents that Teva was first to file a Paragraph IV certification
against.218 In response to Apotex's argument of delay, the court stated that
the possibility of delay fails the MedImmune standard because "at the time
208. See id. at 1360. Additionally, Teva's Paragraph III certification, which requires the
FDA to wait until that patent expires, also implied its belief as to the validity of the '663
patent.
209. See id. at 1359; see also supra Part I.B.4.
210. See Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10
(1974)).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Seeid. at 1361.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 1358, 1361.
217. See id. at 1362.
218. See generally supra Part I.A.3.
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when the district court entered final judgment in this case, Apotex's alleged
harm of indefinite delay of approval was too speculative to create an actual
controversy to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." 219 The
harm was speculative because Teva could not yet have launched and at no
time between filing the declaratory judgment "through the final judgment
was there any basis to conclude that Teva will, or is likely to, delay in
bringing its generic product to market. '220 The court of appeals's rationale
is in line with MedImmune, where the Supreme Court stated that the dispute
must be "'definite and concrete"' and "'real and substantial' in order for
the case to satisfy the Article III case or controversy requirement and to
allow the declaratory judgment action to proceed.221
The court of appeals's decision in Caraco, reversing dismissal of the
declaratory judgment action, and the Janssen decision, affirming the
dismissal of the declaratory judgment action, taken together, suggest that
the law may still be unsettled in this area and that small nuances can make a
big difference in results.222 Also, the declaratory judgment option to
overcoming the approval bottleneck is far from ideal.
III. THE STATUS OF THE "APPROVAL BOTTLENECK" AND A
POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The threat of harm to a consumer, as a result of delayed access to generic
drugs resulting from the approval bottleneck, may seem diminished given
the many ways to overcome the approval bottleneck. However, there are
many reasons, as Part III.A discusses, suggesting that these solutions are far
from ideal. Part III.B goes on to discuss one possible solution to eliminate
the approval bottleneck.
219. See Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1362-63.
220. See id.
221. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 771 (2007) (quoting Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937)).
222. Dey, L.P. v. Sepracor, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 355 (D. Del. 2009), is another example
of a Hatch-Waxman case. It was a district court case, unlike Janssen Pharmaceutica, N. V. v.
Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd.
v. Forest Laboratories Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See id. In attempting to apply
the rule of law regarding covenants not to sue, the struggle by the court and lack of clear
direction from the previous two cases was noted through the following statements: "the
instant case is intermediate to Caraco and Janssen" and "the instant case is more like
Caraco than Janssen." See id. at 361-62. The court went on to state that Dey had not
precluded itself from going to market like Apotex did in Janssen. Id. at 362. Additionally,
the court acknowledged the possibility of going to market earlier than 2012 and therefore
Dey was not just out to extinguish the 180-day exclusivity. Id. Therefore, with the given
possibility to launch earlier, the court denied Sepracor's motion to dismiss the declaratory
judgment action regarding the remaining patent. Id. This is yet another illustration of the
lack of clarity in this area.
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A. No Present Ideal Solution To Overcome or Eliminate the "Approval
Bottleneck"
The MMA was expected to alleviate the approval bottleneck problem. 223
However, as mentioned in Part II.B. 1, the forfeiture provisions do not live
up to that expectation. The agreement forfeiture provision has "no teeth"
because it requires the FTC or Justice Department to have prosecuted the
antitrust case through appeal, as a nonappealable decision is required to
cause a forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity. 224 FTC proceedings alone
could take years, and additional time is required for appellate review.225
The amendment-of-certification forfeiture provision is likewise ineffective
because the provision calls for forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity, if the
First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer amends the Paragraph IV certifications for
all of the listed patents, which rarely occurs. 226 One reason it is rare to
amend all Paragraph IV certifications is because when an ANDA filer
enters into a settlement with the innovator company, the ANDA filer does
not need to amend its Paragraph IV certification.227 The Paragraph IV
certification is still valid, even though there is a settlement, and, therefore,
the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer is still entitled to its 180-day
exclusivity. 228  The failure-to-market forfeiture provision attempts to
prevent the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer from indefinitely parking their
exclusivity and blocking Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers by having
the applicant forfeit its 180-day exclusivity if it fails to market its generic
version by the later of two statutorily defined dates, the (aa) date or the (bb)
date, but this provision also has shortcomings.229 If the First Paragraph IV
ANDA Filer settles with the innovator company, the (aa) date will still
occur, but there will likely be no (bb) date because there will be no court
decision that the patents are invalid or not infringed.230 Without a (bb)
date, there is no forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity because there is no
way to compute the later of (aa) or (bb).231
Furthermore, the MMA's civil action to obtain patent certainty did not
provide a reasonable solution until the 2007 MedImmune decision.232
Therefore, practically speaking, instead of preventing approval bottlenecks,
the MMA just provided clarification of a process to overcome approval
bottlenecks by explicitly stating that any ANDA filer can bring a
declaratory judgment action to potentially declare the innovator's patents
invalid or not infringed.
223. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
224. See supra Part IIB. 1.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See supra Part II.B.2-C.
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Innovator companies, in trying to stay one step ahead, provided
covenants not to sue to Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers in order to
divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment
action.233
Second, dealing with covenants not to sue is another reason why there is
no ideal solution to the approval bottleneck problem. With the lowered
MedImmune standard, case law now provides for an avenue to overcome
covenants not to sue, which could have propagated approval bottlenecks.
Once again, however, there are some limitations that render this solution
less than ideal. 234 The court in Caraco concluded that a covenant not to sue
did not divest the court of jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment
action.235 However, in Janssen, decided in the same court about six months
later, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's declaratory judgment action, where the
innovator company sued the subsequent ANDA filer on one of the three
patents and provided a covenant not to sue with respect to the two
remaining patents. 236 This decision suggests small nuances will affect the
determination of whether covenants not to sue divest the court of subject
matter jurisdiction or whether there is an Article III case or controversy to
allow the action to proceed.237 In Janssen, unlike Caraco, the subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer had removed a Paragraph IV certification with
respect to one of the listed drug's patents by stipulating to its validity.238
That action alone led the court to hold that there was no longer standing,
and, therefore, the declaratory judgment action could not proceed. 239
Furthermore, as illustrated by the recent case of Dey, L.P. v. Sepracor,
Inc. ,240 courts seem to struggle with application of the rule from Janssen
and Caraco.241 Therefore, while each case may still cause harm to the
consumer by delaying access to generic medicine, small differences, which
may not be ultimately clear, impact whether the declaratory action will
proceed or not.
Third, the timing for a Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer to
overcome the approval bottleneck is too long. In order to overcome the
approval bottleneck by triggering the 180-day exclusivity or failure-to-
market forfeiture provision of the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer, a final
court decision by the Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer is required. 242
233. See supra Part II.D.
234. See supra Part II.C-D.
235. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
237. See supra Part II.D.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. 595 F. Supp. 2d 355 (D. Del. 2009).
241. See supra note 222 (discussing the district courts' attempt to deal with covenants not
to sue after Janssen and Caraco).
242. See supra Part I.A.3.
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A final court decision requires a court of appeals decision. 243 A district
court decision takes on average twenty-five months and a decision on
appeal takes on average twelve months, for a total of thirty-seven months
from the start of a patent infringement lawsuit. 244 Therefore, even if
everything works as planned for the Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer
(i.e., a declaratory judgment action is granted and the Subsequent Paragraph
IV ANDA Filer wins the lawsuit declaring the innovator's patents invalid or
not infringed), on average thirty-seven months have already passed just to
trigger the 180-day exclusivity or failure-to-market forfeiture provisions, at
which point the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer will most likely introduce a
generic into the market. Even if the first applicant does not enter the
marketplace at this point, it will still be another 180 days (or seventy-five
days for post-MMA ANDAs) before the FDA can approve the Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's generic version of the listed drug, at which
point a generic version is finally available to the consumer.245 Had there
been no approval bottleneck the FDA could have approved the Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's generic version in a time frame similar to that
of the first applicant. This time frame would entail approval at the earlier of
thirty months after the innovator's receipt of ANDA notice or a district
court determination that the listed drug's patents are invalid or will not be
infringed (averaging twenty-five months). 246 Thus, the approval bottleneck
causes delayed access to generic drugs and increases consumer harm by at
least twelve months and possibly even longer if the Subsequent Paragraph
IV ANDA Filer does not file an ANDA immediately following the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer. Therefore, even in the most ideal case for the
Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer, where the filer is able to overcome
the approval bottleneck, there will still be delayed access to generic
medicine for consumers as a result of the approval bottleneck.
Fourth, one of the main purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act is to
encourage generic companies to challenge suspect patents and, therefore,
bring lower cost generics on the market earlier.247  The Act even
incentivizes the generic companies to challenge suspect patents and take on
the litigation risk by granting a 180-day exclusivity to the First Paragraph
IV ANDA Filer, which could be worth millions of dollars. 248 The 180-day
exclusivity is not available to Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filers.249
This means there will be little incentive for the Subsequent Paragraph IV
ANDA Filers to take on the costly and lengthy litigation process to
overcome the approval bottleneck. 250 Even if the Subsequent Paragraph IV
ANDA Filer is successful, when the Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer
243. See supra Part I.A.3.
244. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
245. See supra Part I.A.3.
246. See supra Part I.A.2; supra note 63 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
250. See generally Part I.A.3.
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enters the market with its generic version of the listed drug, it will probably
be competing with the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's generic version
and possibly an authorized generic as well. 251 The increased number of
generics may make it difficult for the Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA
Filer to recoup its litigation costs, especially given the lengthy process
required to overcome an approval bottleneck, and, therefore, the Subsequent
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer may decide not to pursue a valid suit against
suspect patents.
The reasons laid out above highlight the shortcomings of the current state
of affairs in addressing the approval bottleneck. The threat of harm to a
consumer, as a result of delayed access to generic medicine, may seem
diminished given the many ways to overcome the approval bottleneck, but
is still not ideal. One potential solution to the problem is to completely
eliminate the mechanism that creates the approval bottleneck, further
discussed in Part III.B.
B. A Permanent, Though Not Ideal, Solution to the
"Approval Bottleneck" Problem
The approval bottleneck is an undesired side effect of the operation of the
Hatch-Waxman Act.252 Specifically, the approval bottleneck comes to
fruition as a result of the 180-day exclusivity.253 Without the 180-day
exclusivity there would be nothing stopping the FDA from approving a
Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's generic version of the listed drug
via the normal FDA generic drug approval process timeline, which is what
the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer is normally subject to. 254 This would
be the case because there would be nothing blocking FDA approval for a
Subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA Filer based on the actions of the First
Paragraph IV ANDA Filer since there would be no 180-day exclusivity to
exhaust.255 Further support for removal of the 180-day exclusivity, as a
solution to the approval bottleneck, is the fact that the United States is the
only country to offer such an incentive. 256
However, the consequence of eliminating the 180-day exclusivity is the
removal of a major incentive for ANDA filers to challenge suspect patents
and take on the litigation risks. 257 Even without the 180-day exclusivity,
generic companies may still challenge suspect patents solely for the purpose
251. See generally Part I.A.3.
252. See supra Part I.C.
253. See supra Part I.C.
254. See supra Part I.A.2-3.
255. See supra Part I.A.2-3.
256. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. While a promising solution, even without
the "approval bottleneck," there have been many tactics utilized in Europe "to block...
generic drugs from the European market," which has been estimated to "cost European
health-care systems as much as E3 billion ($3.87 billion) between 2000 and 2007." Jeanne
Whalen & Peppi Kiviniemi, EU Blasts Drug Titans' Tactics, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2008, at
B5.
257. See supra Part I.A.3.
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of being able to produce a generic version of a listed drug. Some generic
companies-especially the bigger generic companies, such as Teva, which
challenges many innovator drug patents regardless of whether it has 180-
day exclusivity-may not mind being the first to challenge suspect patents,
even though patent invalidation would allow other generic companies to
free ride on the successful litigation of the first challenger.258 Furthermore,
even without the 180-day exclusivity, a generic company may be
incentivized to challenge suspect patents and be the first generic to market
because early generic entrants usually maintain a higher market share
among all other generic versions of the drug in the long run and, therefore,
generate higher revenue.259 Finally, even though currently the FDA may
not approve any other ANDAs prior to the expiration of the 180-day
exclusivity, the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer may not be the only generic
version of the listed drug available during the 180-day exclusivity due to an
increase in the practice of authorized generics. 260 The authorized generic,
licensed by the innovator company under its own NDA, is usually in
competition with the First Paragraph IV ANDA Filer's generic drug, which
means the 180-day exclusivity period is not worth as much because there
are actually two generic versions of the listed drug on the market during the
180-day exclusivity. This practice, therefore, already reduces slightly the
importance of the exclusivity period.
The exclusivity period was an incentive to challenge suspect patents and
take on litigation risk.261 As a final thought, one possible incentive option,
if the exclusivity period is eliminated, is a litigation cost-sharing
mechanism. If the court does in fact find the innovator's patents to be
invalid or not infringed, the generic company, challenging the suspect
patents, could be provided a portion of their litigation costs.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of law, from Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. to
the MMA, followed by the MedImmune decision and Caraco, takes
significant steps toward solving the approval bottleneck problem, but
shortcomings in these advances remain. The threat of harm to a consumer
resulting from delayed generic entry caused by the approval bottleneck,
while diminished, still exists. One potential solution is to abolish the 180-
day exclusivity, which would put the United States on par with other
countries. Even though abolishing the 180-day exclusivity would remove
258. See Press Release, Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd., Teva Reports Third Quarter 2008
Results (Nov. 6, 2008), http://www.tevapharm.com/pr/2008/pr 800.asp (stating that Teva
has 86 Paragraph IV ANDA applications of which Teva believes it is the first to file on only
58 of the 86).
259. Gerson Lehrman Group, TEVA Wins First Generic Approval of Foxamax, Expect
TEVA To Hold Market Share (Feb. 11, 2008), http://www.glgroup.com/News/TEVA-wins-
first-generic-approval-of-Foxamax-expect-TEVA-to-hold-market-share-21596.html ("The
first supplier to the market of a generic drug typically holds the market share.").
260. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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an incentive for generic companies to challenge suspect patents, many
generic companies will still seek approval of their generic versions, and the
increased practice of "authorized generics" has already had an impact in
reducing the value of the exclusivity period. Therefore, in the interests of
consumers, the 180-day exclusivity should be eliminated.
Notes & Observations
